Afghanistan: NATO’s Dilemma by Shabab, Safwan
Colgate Academic Review
Volume 6 (Fall 2009) Article 12
7-17-2012
Afghanistan: NATO’s Dilemma
Safwan Shabab
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.colgate.edu/car
Part of the International Relations Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Work at Digital Commons @ Colgate. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Colgate Academic Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Colgate. For more information, please contact skeen@colgate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shabab, Safwan (2012) "Afghanistan: NATO’s Dilemma," Colgate Academic Review: Vol. 6, Article 12.
Available at: http://commons.colgate.edu/car/vol6/iss1/12
145
Afghanistan: NATO’s Dilemma
By Safwan Shabab, Class of 2010
We must not - we cannot - become a two-
tiered alliance of those who are willing to 
fight and those who are not. Such a 
development, with all its implications for 
collective security, would effectively 
destroy the Alliance.                                                                                                                       
- US Defense Secretary Robert Gates 
speaking on NATO in Afghanistan at the 
2008 Munich Security Conference 1
INTRODUCTION
On the 60th year of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization’s founding, 
Afghanistan provides a unique 
opportunity for the alliance to 
demonstrate its credibility as a ‘new 
NATO’. In its first real ‘out-of-area’ 
operation, NATO has a chance to prove 
its strength to operate beyond Europe 
and combat global security threats from 
terrorism and instability. 2 But despite 
proving its early critics such as John 
Mearsheimer wrong during the 1990s, 
NATO’s credibility is once again on the 
line  – Afghanistan  is proving to be a 
difficult test of the alliance’s political will 
                                                
1 Frank Cook, “NATO Operations: Current Priorities 
and Lessons Learned,” in NATO Parliamentary 
Assembly Report 2008, (158 DSC 08 E, 2008), 
14.
2 Article 6 of the Charter applies NATO’s collective 
defense to territories of ‘the Parties in Europe or 
North America…to the islands under the 
jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area 
north of Tropic of Cancer’; what lies beyond the 
confines of this definition ‘out-of-area operation’. 
Afghanistan falls into this latter category.
and military capabilities. 3 NATO’s 
mission – the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) - has been 
marred by a lack of collective action 
amongst its 28 member states and led 
new critics to claim that NATO has been
‘pushed to the edge of collapse’ in yet 
another crisis. 4 Analysts have pointed 
out to the stark disparity in ISAF troop 
contribution and financial commitment 
amongst member states as illustrative of 
the uneven burden sharing and proof of a 
lack of collective effort in stabilizing 
Afghanistan. In this paper, I will ask the 
question: why does the NATO face a 
problem of weak collective action in 
Afghanistan? In answering my own 
query, I will argue that the weakness of 
collective action in Afghanistan arises 
from NATO’s failure to develop specific 
assets to deal with the unique security 
challenges it faces in Afghanistan. In 
particular, I will show that strategic 
ambiguity over mission objectives, a 
divided military command, absence of 
uniform funding channels and 
problematic civilian assets combine to 
raise costs without tangible benefits for 
                                                
3 Writing in 1990, John Mearsheimer had predicted 
that ‘without a common Soviet threat or an 
American night watchman’, a transatlantic 
institution such as the NATO would lose its 
raison-d’être and dissolve. John Mearsheimer, 
“Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” in 
Richard Betts, ed., Conflict After the Cold War, 
(New York: Pearson Longman, 2008), 22.
4 Mark Webber and James Sperling, “NATO: from 
Kosovo to Kabul,” in International Affairs 85:3 
(2009), 491. 
1
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contributing members and impedes 
collective action within NATO in the 
ISAF mission. 
Free-Riding: Evidence from the 
Ground 
It is important to recognize that 
in spite of two waves of expansion and a 
changing security environment, the 
notion of shared risk and responsibility 
remains a ‘founding principle of the 
Alliance.’ 5 And yet the ISAF mission 
presents a classic case of collective action 
problem for the alliance. This problem is 
best viewed in the context of burden-
sharing which Peter Forster and Steven 
Cimbala define as “the distribution of 
costs and risks among members of a 
group in the process of accomplishing a 
common goal.” 6 Mark Webber and 
James Sperling show that in 2008, the 
United States provided 44 percent, 
United Kingdom 17 percent and 
Netherlands 4 percent of total troops to 
the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, while 
others such as Norway (0.9 percent), 
Belgium (0.8 percent) and Portugal (0.1 
percent) fell short of their share of 
contribution, creating a case of 
‘asymmetrical burden sharing’. 7 This 
disparity is true for multilateral aid 
                                                
5 In 1999, NATO asked three new members were 
asked to join the alliance (the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland). In 2004, seven additional 
members joined the alliance (Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia).
6 In NATO’s 2007 Parliamentary Report, only six 
NATO members were at or above the benchmark of 
military expenditure ‘at 2 percent of GDP’ standard: 
Bulgaria, France, Greece, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. Peter Forster and 
Steven Cimbala, The U.S., NATO, and Burden-
Sharing, (London: Routledge, 2005), 164. 
7 Webber and Sperling, 504.
contribution to Afghanistan too: while 
Netherlands contributed nearly 12 
percent of total financial assistance 
between 2002 and 2008, France shared 
less than 2 percent of the aid 
commitment. 
Such disparities reflect a choice of 
‘selective commitment’ by certain 
member states.8 Joel Hillison highlights 
such behavior - the inadequate
contribution to attainment of the 
common goal - as evidence of free riding 
by NATO member states such as Norway 
and Belgium amongst others. 9  The 
interdependency of military operations 
in Afghanistan with civilian tasks of 
policing and economic reconstruction 
requires financial and logistical 
contribution along with military assets; 
as not all member states contribute in 
these areas towards NATO’s goal of 
stabilization and reconstruction, free-
riding by some proves costly for the 
alliance as a whole. 10
                                                
8 Paul Belkin and Vincent Morelli, “NATO in 
Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance”, 
Congressional Research Services Report for 
Congress (August 2009), 22.
9 Joel Hillison, “New NATO Member: Security 
Consumers or Producers?” in Strategic Studies 
Institute Quarterly, April 2009, 3.
10 It is important to note that this uneven burden 
sharing is not so much a transatlantic issue but 
rather an intra-European problem – along with the 
United States, several European states have been 
engaging in high risk and high cost missions as 
part of the ISAF but another set of European 
states opt out of their commitment in Afghanistan. 
Regardless, such a ‘two-tiered’ status of the 
Afghanistan mission is highly problematic, 
especially in context of the growing Taliban 
insurgency and a severe crisis of confidence in the 
Kabul government.  Stanley McChrystal, 
“Commander’s Initial Assessment”, International 
Security Assistance Force Headquarters –
Afghanistan,  August 2009.
2
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Assets and Collective Action
Mancur Olson, in examining 
collective action, argues that in a group 
setting “unless the number of individuals 
in a group is quite small, or unless there 
is coercion or some other special device 
to make individuals act in their common 
interest, rational, self-interested 
individuals will not act to achieve their 
common or group interests.” 11 Despite its 
current size (with 28 member states), 
NATO does not appear to be facing 
institutional problems typically 
associated with a large scale; Celeste 
Wallander attributes this to the presence 
of ‘general assets’ within the alliance. 12
These include the formal bodies such as 
North Atlantic Council (NAC), Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 
(SHAPE) as well as the civilian staff, 
communication channels and a common 
economic infrastructure: for Wallander, 
these assets facilitate communication, 
coordination and eventually consensus 
building and in the process, lower costs 
of transaction on security issues for each 
member state. 13
                                                
11 Marcus Olson, Logic of Collective Action,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 4.
12 Celeste Wallander, “Institutional Assets and 
Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War” in 
International Organization v.54, Autumn 2000, 
707.
13 Alternatively, constructivists such as Emmanuel 
Adler and Michael Barnet, in understanding 
collective action, posit that member states in an 
alliance like NATO need to view security as a 
function of community - states have to share a 
common identity and perceive common meaning 
in operational missions if they are to act 
collectively. Deductively, the absence of these 
common perceptions gives rise to uneven 
commitment to alliance operations. However, I 
argue that, for ISAF, NATO member states readily 
share a common understanding of the serious 
threat from an unstable Afghanistan. This is 
Hence, what Olson refers to as 
the ‘other special device’ is the remaining 
factor which can explain collective action 
– or the lack thereof - within the NATO’s 
mission in Afghanistan. Wallander labels 
these devices as ‘specific assets’ which 
“facilitate particular transactions and 
confer efficiency gains.” 14 She argues that 
in dealing with different sources of 
instability and threats, alliances need 
targeted institutional principles, 
practices and procedures to enable 
member states to mitigate the security 
concern. A military threat needs to be 
addressed with assets that allow the 
alliance to mount credible defense and if 
needed, combat capabilities; dealing with 
political instability requires assets for 
mediation and engagement while 
peacekeeping requires mobile ground 
forces, multinational command and 
police-like rules of engagement. 15 For 
ISAF, it currently faces all of these 
challenges in Afghanistan: there is an 
acute security threat from the Taliban 
insurgency, a challenge of reconstructing 
the weak Afghan economy and it needs 
to be able to secure a stable and 
transparent government. As Wallander 
argues, a responsive institution ensures 
collective action by addressing these 
diverse mission needs through constant 
adaptation and development of new 
specific assets.  I will illustrate that in the 
                                                                        
manifested at two levels: (i) member states’ 
unanimous support for institutional declarations 
such as the Berlin Accord 2004, the Riga 
Declaration 2006 and the new Strategic Vision at 
Bucharest 2009 and (ii) commitment under 
Article 4 of the NATO charter that seeks to 
promote peace, stability and rule of law amongst 
states and now to its out-of area operations which 
includes Afghanistan.  
14 Wallander, 707.
15 Wallander, 710.
3
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context of Afghanistan, NATO has failed 
to develop such a range of specific assets; 
its repertoire of general assets facilitate 
necessary cooperation in Brussels but are 
not sufficient to address the unique 
security demands in Kabul. The absence 
of specific instruments and mechanisms 
- namely strategic ambiguity, a divided 
military command, absence of an 
uniform funding structure and 
problematic civilian assets – limit the 
scope and raise costs of contribution to 
ISAF (such as exposure to combat risks 
and uncertainty in planning for long 
term objectives) without providing any 
discernible and immediate benefit to 
each member state. 16 As a result, 
member states such as Belgium and 
Norway are disincentivized to contribute 
to the mission objectives which in turn 
lead to a complex collective action 
problem.  
The Case of ISAF
Wallander shows that with out-of-
area missions, NATO’s “mission-specific 
command structure needs to be as 
mobile as its forces.” 17 For the ISAF, the 
failure to develop the specific assets in 
security and reconstruction operations 
means that such a responsive structure 
has not materialized across its five 
phases of operations since 2001. 18 19
                                                
16 Well-developed specific assets have been attributed 
for NATO’s success in previous missions. The 
creation of a new planning staff at SHAPE and a 
Crisis Coordination Center in Brussels in 1994 
allowed for a planned and swift deployment of a 
joint task force in Kosovo as the crisis there 
escalated in 1999. Wallander, 718.
17 Wallander, 719. 
18 NATO planned that ISAF operations in 
Afghanistan would have five phases. The first phase 
was “assessment and preparation”, including initial 
Strategic Ambiguity
ISAF was originally created by UN 
Security Council Resolution 1386 in 
December 2001 with military 
responsibilities limited to Kabul. In 2003, 
it assumed full command of ISAF in 
Afghanistan from the US and by 2008, it 
was responsible for (i) providing law and 
order, (ii) promoting governance and 
development, (iii) helping reform the 
justice system and (iv) training an 
Afghan police force and army under 
UNSCR 1883. 20  Within the alliance, 
NATO has attempted to adapt and 
internalize these evolving responsibilities 
by adopting new strategies and 
declarations: in the 2004 Berlin 
Agreement, NATO committed itself to 
‘sufficiently constitute and (make) 
operational’ Afghan security forces while 
the 2008 Strategic Vision confirmed 
NATO’s ‘long term commitment’ to 
Afghanistan and shift to a 
‘comprehensive civilian-military 
                                                                        
operations only in Kabul. The second phase was 
ISAF’s geographic expansion throughout 
Afghanistan completed in 2006. The final three 
phases would involve stabilization; transition; and 
redeployment. At the start of 2009, ISAF was 
operating in Phase III, “stabilization” and Phase IV, 
the “transition” of security responsibility to the 
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) may follow 
soon. Belkin and Morelli, 9.
19 The fast changing environment in Afghanistan 
requires ISAF to cope with threats that arise from 
well organized militants, drug lords as well as 
splinter local groups and governance challenges 
require balancing local loya jirgas and national 
government agencies. To that end, specific assets 
pose a dilemma for ISAF; once developed and 
utilized successfully, the specific assets lose their 
usefulness and operational mobility necessitates new 
specific assets to be deployed.  
20 Belkin and Morelli, 1. 
4
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approach’ while increasingly engaging 
with neighbors, ‘especially Pakistan.’ 21      
The problem with the ISAF 
strategy papers is that these represent 
mostly ‘consensus documents’ and lack 
detailed expectations or commitment 
pledges for each member state (or the 
means of following up on these). Julianne 
Smith and Michael Williams label this as 
NATO’s ‘lack of a roadmap’. 22
Institutional ambiguity about the scope 
and objective of the ISAF mission, most 
importantly at the tactical level, reflects 
failure on NATO’s part to develop a 
specific asset that can continually define 
its mission statement. This infuses 
uncertainty for each member state, 
making it difficult to plan for long term 
military and financial contributions and 
raises the opportunity cost of 
commitment. For instance, shortly after 
the 2004 Berlin Agreement, when the US 
requested ISAF members to assume 
selected counter-insurgency 
responsibilities [originally conducted as 
part of Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF)], some NATO states balked and 
cited that, despite their Berlin 
commitments, combat operations were 
the purview of the US-led OEF and the 
preceding UN Resolution required ISAF 
to engage in stabilization operations 
only. 23 With mission statements lacking 
clarity and defined responsibilities for 
contributing states, NATO members 
have no incentive to engage in riskier 
operations of counter-insurgency and are 
                                                
21 Sperling and Webber, 502.  Belkin and Morelli, 4. 
22 Julianne Smith and Michael Williams, “What Lies 
Beneath: The Future of NATO Through the ISAF 
Prism”, in Royal United Services Institute Report, 
March 2008, 2.
23 Belkin and Morelli, 16.
rather incentivized to free-ride in the 
complex security environment.
Similarly, a 2008 NATO 
Parliamentary Report cited that several 
nation states, including Italy and Spain, 
hold strong to the belief that “the formal 
responsibilities of the Alliance itself have 
always centered almost exclusively on 
one area: the provision of a safe and 
secure environment.” The report 
continues to state that these states feel 
that NATO should not have the lead in 
providing for democratic development, 
agricultural reform, or literacy programs, 
which “more appropriately fall under the 
responsibility of other organizations and 
agencies.” 24 The German Defense 
Minister went as far as asserting that, 
“(Even) this (counter-insurgency) is not 
what the NATO is supposed to do.” 25
This is problematic in the context of the 
challenges faced in Afghanistan: 
stabilization efforts need to be preceded 
by mitigation of threats from the Taliban 
insurgency and specific assets, in this 
case institutional guidelines, are 
necessary to motivate states to engage in 
the mission in a comprehensive manner, 
instead of making ‘selective 
commitments’.  
Perhaps one of the most 
detrimental outcomes of this strategic 
ambiguity are the national caveats. As of 
2008, there were as many as 62 caveats in 
place for the ISAF mission, which had a 
‘direct negative impact’ on mission goals 
in Afghanistan. 26 Almost half of the 
                                                
24 Frank Cook, “Afghanistan: A Turning Point?” in 
NATO Parliamentary Assembly Report 2009, (172 
DSC 09 E), 4.
25 Belkin and Morelli, 17.
26 As described by Commander of NATO’s Joint 
Forces Command Brunssum. Webber and 
Sperling, 509.
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forces in ISAF have some form of caveats. 
These include ban on night-time 
operations, consultation with national 
governments, exclusion of specific 
operations (notably, counter insurgency) 
and even ban on fighting after a snowfall.
The lack of a specific institutional 
guideline (that systematically outlines 
expectation from member states) means 
that ISAF ground commanders have had 
to shape and compromise their conduct 
of missions to fit the caveats of national 
troops - instead of member forces 
adapting to mission-specific 
requirements mandated by a clear 
strategy paper.  For instance, Germany 
provides a large number of troops to 
stabilization efforts (nearly 9 percent), 
but imposes restrictions on where 
German troops can be deployed and on 
rules of engagement. 27 In 2006, this led 
Germany to refuse requests by the US to 
redeploy to the unstable south-eastern 
region: absence of a well-developed 
strategic statement as a specific asset 
means that member states can opt for 
self-designed restrictions and 
consequently hamper the operational 
effectiveness of ISAF.  National caveats 
forfeit NATO’s inherent advantage over 
any adversary in Afghanistan through 
ISAF’s intelligence, speed, firepower, and 
other attributes, and therefore put 
NATO soldiers at higher risk and impose 
additional costs on contributing 
members, creating disincentives from 
acting collectively. 28
                                                
27 Belkin and Morelli, 22.
28 Cook, “Afghanistan: A Turning Point?”, 3. 
Absence of Centralized ISAF Budget  
                     
Despite possessing effective 
general assets, NATO’s budget rules 
appear to perpetuate the inequity in 
burden sharing, more acutely in high 
cost and long-term missions such as the 
one in Afghanistan. When a member 
state agrees to deploy troops to a NATO 
operation, that nation is obligated to pay 
the costs associated with that 
deployment. 29 Thus there is a built in 
disincentive for nations to agree to 
commit troops to a mission or increase 
the size of forces already deployed. This 
complicates efforts for ISAF, especially as 
additional costs have to be borne to 
counter the current Taliban offensive 
and the urgency to secure areas for 
civilian reconstruction projects to start. 
For many member states, this budgetary 
obligation imposes significant domestic 
opportunity costs: one, they have to 
allocate portions of their national budget 
towards ISAF and two,  leaders of fragile 
governments or coalition governments 
often have to expend serious efforts to 
convince their legislatures and publics to 
support deployment and the associated 
costs. A specific asset – in this case, a 
common operational funding system –
could have otherwise minimized the 
burden on certain member states with 
unique domestic political (and 
economic) conditions; reluctant states 
could have still committed troops while 
leaving costs of deployment to be funded 
by a commonly pooled budget.
Smith and Williams labels the 
approach of the current funding system 
as one based on ‘costs lie where they 
                                                
29 Cook, “NATO Operations: Current Priorities and 
Lessons Learned”, 14.
6
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fall’.30 This system deters nations from 
going ‘first in’ for a given operation since 
they have to bear the high costs of 
establishing the very facilities to start up 
in a new theater. For Latvia and Estonia 
amongst other smaller member states, 
this is particularly problematic: these 
start-up expenses are prohibitively high 
and despite their political willingness to 
contribute, they are disincentivized to 
take the lead on establishing new 
mission bases. During Phases I and II, 
this left the larger member states with 
the burden of setting up most facilities as 
ISAF expanded geographically through 
Afghanistan. Additionally, these ‘entry 
costs’ (even if borne by a willing ‘first in’ 
member state)  arguably leads to 
reluctance by states to redeploy to a 
different theater  as they become 
unwilling to leave behind the facilities 
they originally funded and constructed, 
often tailored to specific requirement of 
their national forces. 31 This may partly 
explain the long time hesitance of 
Germany to redeploy part of its 3000-
member troop contingent to southern 
Afghanistan despite continued requests 
by the US and the UK.  Having 
established facilities in northern 
Afghanistan since the early stages of the 
ISAF, Germany had no incentive to 
volunteer or accept request by allies to 
undertake new operations in the more 
volatile areas, which could have 
otherwise benefitted from efforts of a 
well trained and experienced German 
contingent.  Hence, the absence of 
common ISAF funding means that states 
are likely to decide on commitments 
                                                
30 Smith and Williams, 5. 
31 Cook, “NATO Operations: Current Priorities and 
Lessons Learned”, 14.
unilaterally and complicate opportunities 
to act collectively. 
Problematic Military Assets 
A major challenge facing the ISAF 
in Phase III, Stabilization, has been the 
inadequate military assets in place, 
namely a divided military command, a 
problematic troop rotation system and 
lack of mission-specific military 
hardware. The absence or poor quality of 
specific military assets on the ground in 
Afghanistan means that contributing 
member states such as Spain and 
Portugal, weary of domestic public 
backlash, have weak incentives to opt 
into military deployment in high-risk 
areas while others such as the US and the 
UK are left exposed to casualties in the 
unstable south-eastern regions. In other 
words, the inadequate military assets 
raise opportunity costs for contributing 
member states and force them to 
contemplate alternative strategies – ones 
with restricted commitments. 32   
The absence of an integrated 
military command can be best seen in 
the relationship between ISAF 
headquarters and the Regional 
Commands. For instance, in RC-South 
the major troop contributors – the UK, 
Canada, the Netherlands – are strong 
partners relatively unconstrained by 
caveats. But as ISAF officials note, RC-
South effectively includes “four 
provincially-based national campaigns –
Dutch, British, Canadian, and U.S. –
based on the provinces in which their 
                                                
32 An example of a successful military asset 
developed by NATO was In Bosnia in 1994 when 
the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) was 
formed as the combined joint task force to 
manage peacekeeping efforts. Wallander, 726.
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respective troops are deployed.” 33 Each 
of these ISAF countries, in turn, tends to 
lobby the relevant Afghan Ministers in 
Kabul for assistance to “its” province.  
This arguably raise the costs of 
implementing a security project as each 
NATO member state, instead of 
coordinating, expends efforts to work 
through individual connections and end 
up competing for the same resources 
instead of pooling these. This problem of 
an inadequately integrated military 
command is complicated by the 
problematic information flow among 
ISAF participants. In a Congressional 
Report on the ISAF mission, Catherine 
Dale presents evidence that senior U.S. 
officials at the mission HQ in Kabul have 
“a much clearer operational picture of 
eastern and southern Afghanistan”, that 
is regions where most U.S. forces 
operate, than of northern and western 
Afghanistan. 34 Varied communications 
channels, linguistic barriers, and often 
reluctance on part of some countries to 
share information represent constraints 
on information flow, both at a national 
and NATO level. In a volatile security 
environment where coordination and 
timely information is key to combat 
insurgents, such inadequate military 
communication assets can – and does -
lead to tactical errors and expose troops 
to fatal risks that could be avoided 
otherwise.   
Secondly, ISAF has failed to 
develop an effective and uniform troop 
rotation system – a specific military asset 
that could have otherwise distributed the 
                                                
33 Catherine Dale, “War in Afghanistan: Strategy, 
Military Operations, and Issues for Congress,” 
Congressional Research Services Report for 
Congress, (January 2009), 14.
34 Dale, 15.
cost of troop deployment amongst 
member states and allowed for a more 
equitable sharing of the military burden. 
In the context of Afghanistan, a mission 
which requires close cooperation with 
local Afghans as part of a larger  military 
strategy, troops need at least four to five 
months to build necessary relationships 
with local forces and knowledge of the 
terrain in order to be effective. 35  
However, NATO member states have 
varied deployment schedules, anywhere 
between 4 and 6 months which leave 
little time for troops to acclimatize to 
their environment and start undertaking 
operations. Analysts have suggested that 
a rotation of 12-15 months is necessary to 
let troops function effectively on the 
ground; in the absence of such an 
uniform rotation system, ISAF is left with 
a high turnover of personnel who do not 
retain any operational experience or 
knowledge and each member state has to 
bear the additional cost of training and 
adapting a new unit at every cycle of 
deployment.     
Finally, the lack of adequate 
military hardware for ISAF troops once 
again reflects on the failure to develop 
specific military assets, particularly 
important for the rugged terrain and 
challenging conditions of fighting in 
Afghanistan. The NATO Parliamentary 
Report 2008 explains that the absence of 
aviation assets such as strategic lift to get 
to the battlefield,  helicopter suited to 
perform in demanding terrain and 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) which 
can provide critical battlefield 
intelligence, are critically impeding 
ISAF’s ability to deploy troops 
                                                
35 Cook, “NATO Operations: Current Priorities and 
Lessons Learned”, 4.
8
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multilaterally equipped with mission-
specific hardware. 36 Added to this, the 
absence of an ISAF rapid response force 
means that soldiers and civilian 
personnel cannot be fast evacuated when 
under fire, as witnessed during a 2006 
deadly attack on a Norwegian Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT). 37 As 
rational actors, faced with the prospect 
of incurring casualties in combat 
operations while equipped with 
ineffective hardware or backup support, 
member states are motivated to limit 
contribution to the mission, especially 
for counter-insurgency efforts. 
Inadequate Civilian Assets
                    
In a multidimensional security 
environment where civilian 
reconstruction efforts are as critical as 
military successes, especially during the 
stabilization and transitional phases, 
ISAF’s difficulties have been complicated 
by the poor quality of civilian assets at its 
disposal. Perhaps the most notable 
civilian asset developed by the ISAF is its 
PRTs: these are civilian-military units 
assigned to work with Afghan provincial-
level officials to provide and promote 
governance, development and security. 
And yet, owing to their structures, these 
PRTs face serious challenges, deterring 
many member states from contributing 
to PRT-based operations. A total of 26 
PRTs are in place led by 14 different 
nations, each run using an unique 
national approach. 38 Officially, the 
military component of each PRT falls 
                                                
36 Cook, “NATO Operations: Current Priorities and 
Lessons Learned”, 14.
37 Belkin and Morelli, 22.
38 Cook, “NATO Operations: Current Priorities and 
Lessons Learned,” 5.
under ISAF command; however, there is 
no established modus operandi (or 
overall concept of operations), many are 
dominated by military forces rather than 
civilian technicians and prefer reporting 
directly to their national representatives 
than the ISAF Headquarters. 39 As a 
result, there is little coordination 
amongst the PRTs and no scope for 
exchanging information on best 
practices. For instance, the Netherlands 
channels funding for PRTs directly to the 
Afghan government instead of through 
the ISAF mission as it deems that the 
latter must take responsibility for 
planning and implementation of 
projects. In contrast, the US government 
controls the funds for PRTs itself but for 
the very opposite reason: it is 
apprehensive of corrupt Afghan officials 
misusing the funds and prefers to 
exercise direct overview of its PRTs. 40
Without a uniform ISAF approach for the 
PRTs, each member state operate these 
teams at will, perceive the effectiveness 
of these civilian assets differently and 
hence contribute in varying scale and in 
the process frustrates Afghan, UN and 
other partners in their efforts to apply 
resources strategically and effectively. 
In addition, some states such as 
Germany are weary that in some areas, 
civilian relief organizations should not be 
too closely associated with the military 
forces assigned to the PRTs since they 
feel that “their own security and 
perceived neutrality is endangered.” 41 As 
a result, many European member states 
do not provide for an optimum number 
of civilian and military personnel in their 
                                                
39 Belkin and Morelli, 14.
40 Belkin and Morelli, 13.
41 Belkin and Morelli, 12.
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respective PRTs (in addition to being 
minimally funded, as shown in the 
Netherlands case) and are hesitant to 
engage with the Afghan population. 
Some states, notably France, have even 
refused to lead a PRT and questioned the 
NATO’s role in operating these 
reconstruction teams. For what could 
have been an impactful civilian asset as 
part of the ISAF’s comprehensive 
civilian-military approach in 
Afghanistan, the PRTs have been marred 
by operational deficiencies and 
differences and limit the channels for 
member states to contribute through.
It is important to note the ISAF 
has witnessed the positive impact of an 
effective civilian asset in another 
instrument it has developed for itself 
since Phase III, albeit on a minimal scale: 
the Operational Mentoring Liaison 
Teams (OMLTs). These are teams which 
support the Afghan National Army 
(ANA) deployments and coordinate 
between ISAF and ANA to provide 
critical Allied support such as medical 
evacuation.  While OMLTs may not be a 
purely civilian asset, there is much that 
the ISAF can learn from the OMLT 
structure to strengthen its repertoire of 
assets in Afghanistan. These teams are 
comprised of 12-19 personnel, a small size 
that ensures mobility and are deployed 
for at least six months in each theater to 
build strong relationships with the ANA 
and maximize mentoring effort. 42  
Moreover, there are specific objectives 
that each OMLT is assigned with along 
with a tactical guideline that allows for 
incorporation of feedback from local 
Afghan units – such strategic clarity 
                                                
42 Cook, “NATO Operations: Current Priorities and 
Lessons Learned,” 5.
combined with flexibility have allowed 
the OMLTs to concentrate on training 
ANA forces on the ground while 
fostering strong connections with 
Afghans, in this case ANA soldiers. While 
France has largely led the OMLT-based 
efforts and there is still a shortfall of the 
recommended 59 units till date, the 
OMLTs provide example of a well-
developed asset that the ISAF can 
emulate. The OMLT model - with 
institutionalized guidelines, 
responsiveness to changing security 
needs and an optimum size that 
facilitates close interaction with locals –
allows for an asset to be effective in 
achieving specific security or 
reconstruction goals. Such assets in turn 
provide a channel for NATO member 
states to contribute into the ISAF 
mission, especially for those who opt to 
support reconstruction efforts and avoid 
military engagement, either due to 
logistical inability or a lack of political 
willingness.  
CONCLUSION
                      
Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier 
had suggested that NATO should be 
expanded to include partners outside 
Europe in a bid to become a ‘global 
NATO’. 43 And yet those aspirations seem 
premature before the alliance completes 
its mission in Afghanistan – and does so 
successfully. The multidimensional 
challenges in Afghanistan raise questions 
whether NATO is capable of redefining 
itself as a security alliance capable of 
committing beyond Europe.  However, 
despite these current shortcomings, it is 
                                                
43 Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, “Global NATO,” 
in Foreign Affairs. 85,5, 2006.
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important to remember this is not the 
first time that the NATO has faced such a 
challenge. Similar critiques were put 
forth at the end of the Cold War but 
NATO successfully proved its worth by 
engaging in Bosnia and Kosovo during 
the 1990s. Success there was largely 
attributable to its ability to develop 
specific assets to address the unique 
security needs of the operations. And if 
the alliance is to stabilize Afghanistan, it 
needs to do the same. That is the only 
way NATO can draw equitable military 
and financial commitment from its 
member states and sustain the collective 
action that is an absolute necessity in 
winning the complex war in Afghanistan. 
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